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1 Introduction
In late 2009, with the global economy inching out of the Great Recession, the sovereign
debt crisis hit Europe with a remarkable pace and vigor. Fears of sovereign insolvency
initially developed in one peripheral country, Greece, but quickly spread to other European
countries. In this paper, we assess the role of financial linkages in the transmission of
sovereign risk in the Euro Crisis.
Financial linkages may spread sovereign risk across borders through different channels.
Specifically, a looming Greek sovereign default may adversely affect banks in other countries
according to their exposure to Greek sovereign debt. Through implicit guarantees, the
troubled national banking systems constitute liabilities of the respective sovereign, thereby
increasing sovereign credit risk. By the same token, cross-border interbank lending can
matter: as the Greek sovereign debt crisis stresses the Greek banking system, counterparty
risk rises for foreign creditors, affecting the financial health of the latter’s countries.
Sketching this picture, Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Mon-
etary Fund, states that “[f]inancial exposures across the continent are transmitting weak-
ness and spreading fear from market to market, country to country, periphery to core.”1
Likewise, concerns about risk propagation through financial connections have appeared
regularly in the public debate.2
The current paper provides empirical evidence supporting these common beliefs. Specif-
ically, we quantify the contribution of financial linkages to the transmission of sovereign
risk, distinguishing in particular between transmission through exposure to public debt and
through cross-border bank linkages. To this end, we identify financial shocks that originate
in Greece and analyze how the sovereign default risk of European countries, measured by
sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia, responds to these shocks. We then relate the
responses to the cross-border exposure to Greek sovereign debt and debt of Greek banks.
Our results show that financial linkages significantly contribute to the transmission of
sovereign default risk. In particular, bilateral exposure to sovereign debt and cross-border
bank linkages constitute economically and statistically significant transmission channels.
1“Global Risks Are Rising, But There Is a Path to Recovery”: Remarks at Jackson Hole, August 27,
2011
2See Financial Times: ”Greek contagion fears spread to other EU banks”, June 15, 2011.
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Our results suggest that a 10-percent increase in the exposure to Greek debt increases the
rate of cross-country transmission of sovereign risk by 3.94 percent. Similarly, a 10-percent
increase in the exposure to debt of Greek banks implies that sovereign CDS premia react
1.47 percent more strongly to a Greek shock. A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on
these numbers shows that, everything else being equal, the transmission rate to the country
with the greatest exposure to Greece (1.22 percent of GDP) has been roughly 46 percent
higher than the transmission rate to the country with the least exposure (0.08 percent of
GDP).
Methodologically, we consider a vector autoregressive (VAR) model for country CDS
premia, which includes global financial factors as exogenous variables. We adopt the nar-
rative approach of Romer and Romer (1989) to identify exogenous shocks in one country,
focusing specifically on information innovations from Greece or “Greek shocks”. Within
this framework, we estimate whether the exposure to Greek debt has contributed to the
transmission of sovereign risk from Greece to other European countries. In doing so, we
adopt a difference-in-difference approach and we test whether within-country changes in
the response to Greek shocks correlate with within-country changes in exposure to Greek
debt.
The narrative approach has the major advantage that identification is achieved without
imposing a specific pattern for cross-country spillovers on the VAR model. This virtue
is particularly important when analyzing cross-country transmission of risk because stan-
dard identification assumptions, e.g., short-run, long-run or sign restrictions, are difficult
to defend in this context (see Rigobon (2002)). Furthermore, the narrative approach is
especially suitable in the case of daily data, as the identification of the events becomes
much cleaner and the problem of omitted variables - i.e., unobserved simultaneous shocks
outside Greece - is sensibly reduced. Within this framework, we need to control for the
heteroskedasticity of CDS premia between days of exceptional events in Greece and all
other days. We accordingly construct a general least squares (GLS) estimator that allows
us to derive efficient estimates of the effects at study.
Some concerns need to be addressed when pursuing the narrative approach. Impor-
tantly, CDS responses in other countries would be erroneously attributed to spillovers from
Greece if simultaneous shocks to these countries or to global factors occurred on the days of
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Greek news. We argue that our identification of Greek shocks and of risk spillovers through
financial linkages are most likely unaffected by this problem for the following reasons.
First, we take special care in reviewing financial news to exclude from our analysis those
Greek events that occurred simultaneously with relevant financial news in other countries.3
Next, by controlling for global financial factors in the estimation, common shocks that
affect sovereign risk through general market conditions are accounted for. Moreover our
difference-in-difference approach is not likely to suffer from an omitted variable bias. Specif-
ically, we would observe a bias in our estimates only if the change over time of the response
to unobserved shocks correlates with the change in exposure to Greek debt. We claim that
such a systematic link is rather implausible. Nevertheless, it could be that changes in expo-
sure to Greek debt correlate with changes in countries general exposure to risk. In this case
our results could be driven by the updating of investors’ beliefs regarding systemic risk on
days of Greek news rather than by the direct transmission of Greek shocks. To address this
concern, we re-estimate our model, replacing exposure to Greek debt with exposure to total
foreign debt. The results indicate that exposure to foreign debt from origins other than
Greece is unrelated to the reaction of sovereign risk. We thus conclude that our estimates
of risk spillovers through direct financial linkages with Greece are not likely to be driven
by contemporaneous changes in global conditions or market sentiment.
Potential endogeneity problems are another source of concern. Clearly, the exposure to
Greek debt reflects endogenous decisions of banks, which may well be related to sovereign
risks. For our results to be spurious in our difference-in-difference approach, the increase
in the sensitivity of a country’s sovereign risk to Greek shocks should lead domestic banks
to raise their exposure to Greek debt. We find this possibility hard to defend. Moreover,
it is reasonable to assume that the change in exposure rates, which occurs quarterly in our
data, is exogenous to changes in the cross-country responses of CDS premia on a limited
number of days within each quarter.
The classic use of the narrative approach has also been disputed in the past. Romer and
Romer’s (1989) original identification strategy through episodes of monetary contraction
has been criticized. The effects of the policy events selected using a narrative approach
are said to be indistinguishable from those of omitted economic fundamentals (Hoover and
3A detailed description of the data and the selection procedure follows in Section 2.
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Perez (1995)). Additionally, the events considered may constitute an endogenous policy
response to previous movements in economic conditions (Leeper (1997); see also the reply
by Romer and Romer (1997).4 We argue that these standard lines of critique do not apply
to our setup. First, the high frequency of our data relieves us of the specific problem of
reverse causality: a daily blip in the CDS premium cannot reasonably be believed to cause
major political action in Greece on the same day (compare Table A1 in the Appendix).
Second, unlike Romer and Romer (1989), we measure the immediate effect of the selected
Greek events, i.e., the change of CDS premia on the same day, instead of medium- and long-
term effects that could be driven by macroeconomic fundamentals.5. Finally, we also argue
that our identification is intact even when events are partially anticipated as we measure
the rate of transmission based on the response of other European countries relative to the
size of the contemporaneous shock in Greece. A partial anticipation of future shocks thus
has no effect on the estimates of this relative transmission.
1.1 Literature Review
The mechanism of cross-country contagion and transmission of financial turmoil is at the
core of a large empirical and theoretical literature. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) distinguish
between three different concepts: first, response to common shocks; second, fundamental-
based contagion, which operates via direct trade or financial linkages; third, pure contagion,
which operates through portfolio rebalancing and investors’ herding behavior.6 Our paper
addresses fundamental-based contagion, and is close to the spirit of Forbes (2004) and
Forbes and Chinn (2004).7 Contrary to the latter study, our results indicate that bank
linkages constitute an important transmission channel.8 Likely reasons for these differences
4Leeper (1997) notes that the events that Romer and Romer (1989) use to identify the response to
monetary shocks (contractions of the FED) are predictable by past macroeconomic variables and that
unpredictable changes do not generate responses that look like typical effects of monetary policy. Romer
and Romer (1997) argue that the results in Leeper (1997) are due to overfitting.
5We also refer to the lag structure of the VAR here, which generally captures trends of the dependent
data. See the description of our autocorrelation tests in Section 4.
6A necessarily incomplete list of papers includes Baig and Goldfajn (1999), Schinasi and Smith (2000),
Kyle and Xiong (2001), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Corsetti et al. (2005), Broner et al. (2006).
7See also Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Hernandez and Valdes (2001), Van Rijckeghem and Weder
(2001, 2003).
8Analyzing stock market returns, Forbes and Chinn find that bank channels are significant only in some
of their specifications.
5
are the relatively strong European financial integration and the use of time variation to
identify spillovers traveling through cross-border bank exposures.
Inspecting the role of common shocks, Longstaff et al. (2011) show that global factors,
such as the US stock market return or the VIX volatility index, account for a large fraction
of the common variation in CDS premia around the world. Borri and Verdelhan (2011)
have a model where adverse shocks to the financial center (e.g., the US) determine, through
investors’ risk aversion, a change of risk premia in the periphery. Furthermore, the change
depends on the business cycles synchronization with the financial center. We see our
results as complementary to these studies insofar as we control for global factors in our
estimations.9
In terms of methodology, we are not aware of any paper in the contagion literature
applying a narrative approach to the identification of country-specific shocks and their
transmission. We acknowledge, however, that the narrative approach exhibits some com-
monalities with a classic event-study methodology, which has been previously applied to
study the international transmission of financial crises (e.g., Forbes (2004)). This method-
ology usually considers a market model to explain the behavior of financial assets during
normal times and then compute for specific event-window the abnormal returns, defined
as deviations from the model predictions. In our study, we are forced to use a VAR model
to account for the large autocorrelation of CDS premia during the Euro Crisis. Second,
event studies are typically based on a single event-window of extended length rather than
on a collection of daily events. Our definition of an event is thus more conservative since a
clear identification of the exact origin of the event is much easier to motivate for short-lived
single-day events. Third, we estimate the contribution of financial linkages in the spreading
of abnormal returns by adopting a one-stage procedure rather than the two-stage proce-
dure frequently adopted in event studies. Our procedure thus allows us to handle the
heteroskedasticity of abnormal returns and to obtain efficient estimates.10
The unfolding Euro crisis is currently stimulating rich academic output, which can be
covered here only partially. A large part of this literature has focused on the role of finan-
9Furthermore, in a VAR model, the response of risk premia to global factors can differ across countries,
as suggested by Borri and Verdelhan (2011).
10Forbes (2004) alternatively uses a two-stage procedure, where the second-stage uses a weighted esti-
mator, proposed by Sefcik and Thompson (1986), in order to handle efficiently the heteroskedasticity of
abnormal returns.
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cial linkages in the spread of the crisis. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) develop a comprehensive
theoretical analysis of transmission of sovereign risk through an integrated banking system.
The authors note that, although “diversification generates risk diversification benefits ex
ante, it also generates contagion ex post.” Using sovereign and bank CDS premia between
2007 and 2010 and a series of bank bailouts, Acharya et al. (2011) provide evidence that a
weak banking sector increases the default risk of the sovereign, showing in particular “that
the announcement of financial sector bailouts was associated with an immediate, unprece-
dented widening of sovereign CDS spreads and narrowing of bank CDS spreads.”11 In line
with these findings, Dieckmann and Plank (2010) find “a private-to-public risk transfer
through which market participants incorporate their expectations about financial indus-
try bailouts and the potential burden of government intervention.” Focusing on the role of
financial news, Bhanot et al. (2011) report results that “point to the role of news announce-
ments and the banking channel as important transmission channels in the crisis period.”
Finally, Arezki et al. (2011) find that “sovereign rating downgrades have statistically and
economically significant spillover effects both across countries and financial markets.” The
authors discuss several channels of spillover of sovereign risk across countries, pointing es-
pecially to “the holding of foreign sovereign debt by domestic banks...” and to the claims
of banks “on banks in other countries” (see also Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2010) and
Sy (2010)).
Our contribution to this empirical literature is twofold. First, building on the docu-
mented roles of bank-to-bank and bank-to-sovereign linkages as transmission channels of
sovereign risk, we take the broader perspective of the country level and analyze cross-
country spillovers and the role the national exposure rates in the transmission of sovereign
risk. Second, we evaluate the transmission mechanism through the careful identification
of financial shocks that originated in Greece and through the time variation in national
exposure rates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data in
detail, and Section 3 lays out the empirical framework. Section 4 presents and discusses
our main findings, and Section 5 concludes.
11Balteanu and Erce (2011) study the feedback effects between bank crises and sovereign defaults in
emerging economies.
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2 Data
Our analysis requires a combination of three main data types: (i) a measure of sovereign
default risk; (ii) a measure of bilateral financial linkages; and (iii) a classification of shocks
that identifies, in particular, those of Greek origin. The key sources for the first and second
types of data are Datastream and the BIS, respectively. We compile the third on our own.
Sovereign default risk. Our measure of a country’s default risk is a five-year sovereign
Credit Default Swap (CDS) premium, collected by CMAN and provided by Bloomberg. A
CDS is essentially an insurance contract between two counterparties, typically traded over
the counter. It transfers credit risk from one party, the buyer of protection, who pays “a
regular fixed premium to the seller of protection in return for compensation contingent on
the occurrence of a specified credit event” (Barclays Capital 2010). A credit event, in turn,
is a general form of partial or full default by the borrower. In the case of a sovereign CDS
contract, the borrower is the sovereign of a country, and the underlying debt security is
a government bond of a certain specified type and duration. The most frequently traded
sovereign CDS contracts are typically five-year on-the-run government bonds, which have
commonly been monitored, quoted and commented on in the course of the recent debt
crisis.12 Our analysis relies on this particular specification of sovereign CDS contracts.
Since 22 June 2009, the European CDS market has applied the Standard European
Contract (STEC) that fixes trading conventions. These specify that: (i) quotations are for
one of four fixed coupons: 25bp, 100bp, 500bp and 1000bp; (ii) the definition of a credit
event comprises restructuring; and (iii) the premium leg incorporates a full first coupon,
and accrued interest is paid at inception. Moreover, quoted spreads assume a flat credit
curve to calculate the up-front payment and a recovery rate conventionally fixed at 40%
for Western sovereigns (see Barclays Capital 2010). Although CDS premia do not capture
default risk perfectly, recent literature has documented that they nevertheless constitute
a quite reliable measure and are certainly among the best available (Pan and Singleton
(2008), Stulz (2010) and Fontana and Scheicher (2010)).
Figure 1 plots daily five-year sovereign CDS premia separately for “PIGS” countries
(Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) and eight other “Northern” European countries for
12See Packer and Suthiphongchai (2003), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r qt0312g.pdf.
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Figure 1: Sovereign CDS Premia
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Five-year sovereign CDS premia of selected European countries at daily frequency
from January 2008 to March 2011. Units of the vertical axis are basis points (a level
of 100 bp implies that it costs 0.01 Euro per year to protect one Euro of outstanding
debt over the five-year period). Source: Bloomberg.
the period from January 2008 to March 2011.13 These graphs are familiar to the reader
of financial news: the curves not only track financial troubles at the height of the Great
Recession, but also illustrate the buildup of the Euro crisis; in particular, the market’s
assessment of a potential Greek sovereign default following the budgetary announcements
13Ireland, the additional I in the usual PIIGS acronym, is excluded from our sample for the following
reason. In the last quarter of 2010 we observe a sharp decline in the exposure of Irish banks to Greek debt.
This drop is likely to be caused by the creation in late 2010 of a nationalized “bad bank absorbing troubled
assets owned by Irish banks, without actually changing the exposure to Greece. We are concerned that
the inclusion of Ireland might bias our results.
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by Greek authorities in fall 2009.
The figure suggests strong co-movements of the countries CDS premia. Indeed, Table
1 reports pairwise correlations of log-changes for the fourteen countries. These pairwise
correlations range between 0.6011 (Sweden and Greece) and 0.8952 (Italy and Spain), with
an average of 0.7290. In addition to the obvious effects of common factors (see Fontana
and Scheicher (2010)), part of that correlation is likely to be generated by spillover effects
from one troubled country – e.g., Greece – to other countries in the sample.
Financial linkages. Bilateral banking linkages are measured using data from the
Consolidated Banking Statistics of the BIS. This dataset covers banks’ claims to non-
residents, broken down by nationality of borrower and creditor and four types of debt: (i)
Public Debt; (ii) Private Bank Debt; (iii) Private Non-Bank Debt; and (iv) Other Debt
(see BIS (2006)). Reporting entities are bank head offices, including the exposures of their
foreign affiliates (i.e., subsidiaries and branches); reported data cover financial claims on
the balance sheet, consolidated on a worldwide basis within each banking group (i.e., inter-
office positions are netted out).14 The final dataset provides a matrix of cross-country
bilateral (gross) bank exposures, evaluated at market prices.15
The BIS reports the data in US dollars after converting the positions originally reported
in other currencies using end-of-quarter exchange rates. As most of the countries in our
sample belong to the Euro Area, we convert the data back into Euros using the end-of-
quarter exchange rate provided by the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF.
This conversion allows us to remove potential valuation effects that are common to all
countries, which might introduce an exogenous variation in our measure of financial linkages
and thus affect our estimates. Finally, we normalize banks’ exposure by the average GDP
of the corresponding country to control for different country sizes. The data on GDP refer
to the 2009-2010 period and come from the IFS.
Figure 2, top panel, illustrates gross cross-border exposure of BIS-reporting banks,
14BIS (2006) specifies that balance-sheet relevant instruments include ”certificates of deposit (CDs),
promissory notes and other negotiable paper issued by non-residents, banks’ holdings of international notes
and coins, foreign trade-related credits, claims under sale and repurchase agreements with non-residents,
deposits and balances placed with banks, loans and advances to banks and non-banks, holdings of securities
and participations including equity holdings in unconsolidated banks or non-bank subsidiaries.”
15In addition, BIS (2006) reports a number of valuation practices recommended to reporting entities to
ensure the cross-country comparability of data. In addition to the use of market prices to evaluate claims,
these practices specify how to report arrears, provisions and the write-off of claims.
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Figure 2: Foreign Debt Exposure by Type
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Exposure of BIS reporting banks to European debt (top panel) and Greek debt (bot-
tom panel) by type of debt: Public, Bank and Non-Bank Private, and Other. Quar-
terly data are reported on an immediate borrower basis (for a comparison between
immediate and ultimate borrower bases, see the Appendix). The set of 11 countries
includes: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and UK. Source: BIS, Consolidated Banking Statistics.
aggregated across the eleven European countries in our sample, by type of debt. It shows
that, during the height of the financial crisis, the total foreign positions were rewound,
in particular those of bank debt. With the onset of the year 2010, the downward trend
has continued, but moderately so. The picture is different when focusing on Greek foreign
debt to the remaining ten countries (bottom panel). Here, the largest decrease in debt
exposure occurred during the year 2010, with positions in sovereign debt dropping the
most in absolute terms.16
16In principle, the decrease in the exposure to Greek bonds may result from valuation effects. Thus,
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It is important to notice that neither the levels nor the trends in the exposure to Greek
debt are uniform across all countries. Table 2a shows that within the set of ten European
countries, average exposures vary between roughly 0.08 and 1.22 percent of GDP (for 2009
and 2010). Table 2b reports summary statistics of the evolution of exposure to Greek debt
following the fourth quarter 2009, for which levels are normalized to 100.17 Panel A reports
numbers for total debt by quarter. The last column thus shows that, on average, the expo-
sure to Greek debt was 67.5% of the initial level. The country for which exposure changed
the least reduced its exposure by 0.2% (100-99.8), and the largest reduction amounted to
77.2%. Panel B summarizes exposures for Greek public debt. Up to 2010Q4, the average
country reduced its exposure to 73.0% of the initial level. The maximum reduction was
82.3%, and one country actually increased its exposure by 13.1%. Finally, panel C reports
the numbers based on Greek bank debt. Between 2009Q4 and 2010Q4, the average country
reduced Its exposure to 32.0% of the initial level. The maximum reduction reached 97.7%,
and at least one country increased its exposure (by 4.2%). Our aim is to exploit these
cross-country differences in time variation to extract information about how sovereign risk
is transmitted via exposure to the different classes of Greek debt.
These data are reported on the immediate borrower basis and do not include credit
derivatives and guarantees, which could shift risk exposure across countries. Thus, the ac-
curacy of effective exposure is a potential source of concern. Unfortunately, the availability
of data on the ultimate risk basis is very limited. Not only would the use of the ultimate
borrower basis limit our sample, but Greece would drop out of it. A comparison between
the data on the immediate and ultimate basis shows that the two measures covary very
closely.
Greek Shocks. The third type of required information is a list of those days when
financially relevant news was dominated by information from Greece. For our identification
strategy, it is essential that we are able to claim that Greece is the only origin of a first-
order shock. Pioneering the ““narrative approach, ,” Romer and Romer (1989) stress that
to ensure international comparability, the BIS recommends ”that banks’ international claims be valued at
market prices” but acknowledges that, where ”market values are not appropriate, contractual or nominal
values should be used.” Moreover, differences across countries arise because ”loans in the banking books,
which in principle should be assigned nominal value, should be valued in accordance to the reporting
countries’ accounting standards.” (BIS 2006)
17The beginning of the Greek sovereign debt crisis can be dated to 2009Q4.
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potentially severe problems may arise when isolating the shocks due to the judgmental
and retrospective nature of the selection process. To reduce the unconscious bias in this
selection process, we keep our selection as mechanical as possible. Specifically, we first
construct a timeline describing the Euro crisis by merging three sources: the Financial
Times (Interactive Timeline: Greek Debt Crisis), the Wall Street Journal (Europe’s Debt
Crisis - Timeline), and Reuters (Europe’s Debt Crisis Timelines).18 The joint timeline
compiled from this information covers a period starting November 5, 2009, and ending
November 28, 2010, and includes those days that appear to be relevant to the authors
of at least one of these timelines. We mechanically extract the days that contain news
from Greece. We then limit the resulting list of days by excluding all days when financially
relevant news items are reported from countries other than Greece. In addition, we perform
a second round of elimination by searching for potential overlapping shocks originating in
other countries based on the Lexis-Nexis database. The events thus collected are then
classified as days of positive shocks or negative shocks, depending on whether we expect
the Greek CDS premium to either increase or decrease on that day. The final list of events
comprises 14 information shocks identified as Greek shocks and is reported in Table A1
along with a short description of the corresponding event.
Initial inspection of the data reveals two important aspects of CDS premia on the days
classified as Greek events. First, on these days, we observe large movements in the Greek
CDS premium relative to the rest of the sample. Table 3a reports summary statistics of
daily log-changes in the Greek CDS premium, partitioning the sample into days of positive
Greek shocks, days of negative Greek shocks and all remaining days, respectively. On
average, the Greek CDS premium varies by more than 7% during Greek events, whereas
the average change in the rest of the sample is 0.26%. Greek events have also coincided
with episodes of extreme variation in the Greek CDS premium: the largest increase in
the Greek CDS premium (27.00%) occurred on a day of positive Greek shocks. Similarly,
the second largest drop in the Greek CDS premium (-15.70%) is associated with a Greek
event.19
18See http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/003cbb92-4e2d-11df-b48d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1eQwHrlj,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704448304575195863350731920.html and
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/25/eurozone-crisis-events-idUSLDE67O0YD20100825
19Notice that the largest drop in the Greek CDS premium (-47.10%) coincides with the joint EU-IMF
announcement of a 110bn Euro bailout package for Greece. However, we had to exclude this announcement
from the list of pure Greek events as the EU Council agreed on the same day to establish the first European
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Looking at the other European countries, we find that exposure to Greek debt above
the country median is on average associated with larger CDS variation during Greek events.
Table 3b reports summary statistics of the log-changes in the CDS premia of the 10 Eu-
ropean countries in our sample by rate of exposure to Greek debt (above or below the
country median) and by type of Greek event (positive or negative). As shown in Panel A,
total exposure above the country median is associated on average with a 3.03% increase
in CDS premia on the days of positive Greek shocks and a 2.99% decrease on the days
of negative Greek shocks. These numbers shrink to 1.85% and 0.49%, respectively, when
exposure is below the median. Panels B and C show similar patterns in the cases of expo-
sure to public debt and to private bank debt, respectively. Overall, these numbers suggest
that the within-country variation in exposure to Greece could affect the transmission of
Greek shocks to other European countries. In the next section, we describe the empirical
framework that we adopt to test this hypothesis.
3 Empirical Framework
In this section, we discuss our approach to identifying sovereign risk spillovers across coun-
tries. We start by considering the n-dimensional vector autoregressive model
yt = Φy(L)yt−1 + Φxxt + ut
where yt is a vector of CDS premia for each country, Φy(L) =
∑J
j=1 Φy,jL
j−1 is a polynomial
of n× n matrices in the lag operator, xt is a m-dimensional vector of exogenous variables
that includes the constant, and ut is a vector of innovations. In a more compact form, this
model can be written as
yt = Φzt + ut, (1)
where Φ = [Φy,1, . . . ,Φy,J ,Φx] is a n×p matrix and zt = [y′t−1, . . . , y′t−J , x′t]′ is a p×1 vector,
where p = nJ +m.
The innovations ut are jointly correlated reflecting cross-country spillovers. Following
standard practice, we assume
ut = Bt, (2)
stabilization mechanism with the aim of safeguarding financial stability in all member states.
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where t is an i.i.d. vector of country-specific shocks with zero mean. The matrix B instead
reflects the rate of transmission of these shocks across countries. Without loss of generality,
we normalize the diagonal elements of B to one.
3.1 Identifying Spillovers using a Narrative Approach
As part of our identification strategy, we decompose each country-specific shock into a
signed mean shift, which shall reflects “exceptional” events, and a residual noise, which
shall reflect “normal” shocks. Specifically, for each component i, we assume
i,t = di,tξi + νi,t
where di,t ∈ {−1, 0, 1} is a signed indicator function which is independent across countries;
ξi is a time-invariant parameter; and νi,t is independent of di,t and i.i.d. across countries
and time.20 Applying the same decomposition to each country, we can write
t = Dtξ + νt
where Dt is a diagonal matrix with entries di,t. By adopting the “narrative approach” of
Romer and Romer (1989), we are able to identify the dates on which an exceptional event
occurred in Greece but in no other country. Using the signed indicator 1gr,t to denote the
days of Greek events, we can thus write
t = 1gr,tξ
gr + (1− |1gr,t|) ξngrt + νt
where ξgr denotes the vector of exceptional shocks in Greek events and thus is zero except
for its Greek component ξgr. Meanwhile, ξ
ngr
t ≡ Dt ξ reflects the random occurrence of
exceptional shocks in other countries in all other periods.
Combining (??) and (2), we can rewrite our original model (1) as
yt = Φzt + β · 1gr,t + u˜t, (3)
where β ≡ Bξgr and u˜t is a modified residual defined as
u˜t ≡ 1gr,tugrt + (1− |1gr,t|)ungrt
ugrt ≡ Bνt (4)
ungrt ≡ B(ξngrt + νt).
20Despite being quite restrictive, the assumption that the effect of exceptional events is constant over
time does not affect our results but conveniently reduces notation.
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In model (3) the coefficient of interest is β, whose components measure the average
response of sovereign risk in each country to a shock in Greece. We cannot however use a
standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique to estimate β as we cannot sustain the
assumption of conditional homoskedasticity in u˜t. By construction, u
gr
t from (4) depends on
the ”normal” shocks νt only, while u
ngr
t is the sum of νt and, potentially, the ”exceptional”
shocks di,tξ
i
t in all countries. Our strategy thus forces us to derive an estimator that
allows for the presence of two alternating regimes in the variance-covariance matrix of the
residuals.
Case 1: Two Regimes of VCV. Writing Φ˜ = [Φ, β] and z˜t = [z
′
t,1gr,t]
′, we can
reformulate model (3) as
yt = Φ˜z˜t + u˜t,
which is formally equivalent to (1). Accounting for heteroskedasticity, we assume that
Et(u˜t) = 0, Et(u˜tu˜
′
t) =
{
Σgr if t ∈ T gr
Σngr otherwise
, Et(u˜tu˜
′
s) = 0 for s 6= t,
where T gr is the known subset of pure Greek events and the two matrices Σgr and Σngr have
full rank and are invertible. We refer to the Appendix for the derivation of a generalized
least squares (GLS) estimator of Φ˜, which accounts for this specific type of heteroskedas-
ticity.
In addition to the arising heteroskedasticity, we need to address another complication of
the narrative approach. Specifically, we cannot infer the rate of cross-country transmission
of sovereign risk directly from our estimates of β. By construction each component βk equals
the actual rate of transmission from Greece to country k, as measured by the component
B(k,gr), times the average magnitude of Greek events ξ
gr. To obviate this problem, we
exploit the linearity of our model and estimate the rate of transmission by looking at the
response of each country k relative to that of Greece, or βk/βgr. The coefficient βgr equals
ξgrt , so this ratio captures exactly B(k,gr). We then compute a confidence interval for each
of these ratios by bootstrapping the residuals from regression.21
21In doing so, we take special care to resample the residuals only within each variance-covariance regime,
not across them, to satisfy the assumption of invariance in distribution that underlies the bootstrapping
technique.
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3.2 Inspecting the Role of Financial Linkages
In order to identify the contribution of financial linkages to the overall transmission of
sovereign risk, we exploit the time variation in the exposure of other countries to Greek
debt. This difference-in-difference approach enables us to disentangle the role of financial
linkages from other channels of transmission, ranging from trade interdependence to non-
fundamental-based linkages. We observe, indeed, that financial exposure tends to move
much faster than real bilateral linkages, and its evolution is not directly linked to changes
in market sentiments.
Specifically, we allow the spillover matrix B in (2) to vary over time, reflecting a change
in the financial linkages across countries. As our measure of financial linkages is reported on
a quarterly basis, we let Bq to denote the transmission matrix in quarter q and we assume
Bq = B0 + dLq, (5)
where B0 is a constant matrix capturing all time-invariant channels and the components of
Lq are our measures of financial linkages, which vary across quarters. In (5), d measures the
effect of a change in financial linkages on the transmission of sovereign risk and is assumed
to be equal across country pairs.22
Substituting for (5) into (2), we can rewrite our baseline model as
yt = Φzt +
(
δ0 + δ1lgr,q
) · 1gr,t + u˜t, (6)
where δ0 ≡ (I + B0)ξgr is a n × 1 vector, δ1 ≡ d · ξgr is a scalar and lgr,q is a n × 1 vector
of cross-border financial exposures to Greece.
Our main goal is to estimate the coefficient δ1 in (6), from which we will subsequently
obtain the value of the parameter of interest d through divsion by the coefficient measuring
the Greek average response. Technically, δ1 is assumed to be constant across the equation
of the VAR model and therefore its estimation requires a cross-equation restriction on the
interaction coefficient appearing in the above specification. Furthermore, implicit in model
(6) is the fact that the residual u˜t now depends on Bq (see (4)) and thus has a variance-
covariance matrix that can vary both across regimes (Greek and non-Greek) and across
22Furthermore, we maintain our previous normalization and set all diagonal entries of B0 to one (the
diagonal entries of Lq are zero by construction).
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quarters q. We thus need to derive an estimator that allows us to address these properties
of the model.
Case 2: Restricted Regressors and N Regimes of VCV. Consider the following
model
yt = Φ˜z˜t + u˜t Φ˜
′
(k) = Rk · ck, (7)
for k = 1, . . . , n. Here, Φ˜ = [Φ, δ0,∆1], z˜t = [z
′
t,1gr,t, l
′
gr,q ·1gr,t]′. Thus, ∆1 denotes a vector
of coefficients on the interaction term lgr,q · 1gr,t. The equation on the right specifies a set
of linear restrictions on each row Φ˜(k) of the matrix of coefficients Φ˜. Imposing
Rk =
 Ip×p 0p×1 0p×101×p 1 0
0n×p 0n×1 ek
 and ck = [Φ(k), δ0,k, δ1]′
where ek is the kth unit vector of length n, this model is identical to our specification (6).
The residual process satisfies the following set of assumptions:
Et(u˜t) = 0, Et(u˜tu˜
′
t) =
{
Σgr,q if t ∈ Tq ∩ T gr
Σngr,q if t ∈ Tq\T gr
, Et(u˜tu˜
′
s) = 0 for s 6= t, (8)
where Tq is the set of dates in quarter q and T gr is defined as in Case 1. This formulation
allows the variance-covariance matrix of residuals to depend on the quarter q within the two
regimes. We refer once again to the Appendix for a technical description of the restricted
GLS estimator we use to estimate model (7) under the specific type of heteroskedasticity
assumed in (8).
We are now ready to perform our estimations. Specifically, in a two-step procedure, we
would first estimate (6) by simple OLS, compute the residuals to obtain estimates for the
quarter-specific VCV matrices Σngr,q and Σgr,q and then use these matrices to estimate the
feasible GLS. The value of d can then be inferred by normalizing the estimate of δ1 by the
average size of Greek events, which, by our normalization of B0, corresponds to the Greek
component of δ0. We then construct the confidence interval by repeating the two-step
estimation procedure with bootstrapped residuals to obtain a synthetic distribution for the
estimate of d.
Continuing on this path, however, we face the difficulty that the quarterly sets of dates
with Greek events, Tq, contain, on average, less than two elements. Thus, the standard
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estimate of the quarter-specific variance-covariance matrix
Σˆgr,q =
1
|Tq ∩ T gr|
∑
t∈Tq∩T gr
u˜tu˜
′
t
delivers matrices that do not have full rank and cannot be inverted for the calculation of
the GLS estimations. We address this problem by simply taking the time-average variance-
covariance matrix for all quarters.
4 Results
This section summarizes the results of the GLS estimations of the transmission of sovereign
risk. We begin by estimating model (3) to assess average, time-invariant transmission. We
then turn to model (6) to analyze the role of the financial linkages.
Unless explicitly described otherwise, the dependent vector yt consists of five-year
sovereign CDS premia of eleven European countries (including Greece), logged and dif-
ferentiated.23 We take logs to avoid giving excessive weight to the relatively large reactions
of “PIGS’ or other troubled countries (compare Figure 1). Intuitively, a jump in the Ger-
man CDS premium from 30 to 50 basis points should be considered much more dramatic
than an increase of the Portuguese CDS premium from 450 to 470 basis points. The vector
of independent variables z˜t comprises the lags yt, exogenous variables xt, the Greek dummy
and, when estimating model (6), the interaction of the Greek dummy with a measure of
financial exposure to Greece. To control for common shocks affecting global market condi-
tions, the vector of exogenous variables consists of the following variables: sovereign CDS
premia of the US and Japan (logged and differentiated as all other CDS premia), the VIX
index for the US (logged), stock market returns for the US (defined as log changes of the
S&P index), the US federal fund rate, and seasonal dummies for each day of the week.
The data are reported on a daily basis, except for the data on financial linkages. They
span a period of 500 business days for the calendar years 2009 and 2010.24
23We differentiate the CDSs to make them stationary. The estimation results remain intact for HP-
filtered data.
24The eleven countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and UK.
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4.1 Baseline Specification Time-Invariant Transmission
In our baseline specification, we estimate model (3). The coefficient β is constant over the
entire period and thus captures the time-average of the responses to the identified Greek
shocks by the ten other European countries.
Our tests of autocorrelation of the residuals prompt us to include eight lags of the
dependent variable and no lag of the exogenous variables. Moreover, we disregard het-
eroskedasticity within the set of days where Greek events occur.
Table 4a reports the results for the baseline specification. The columns correspond to
the elements of the vector yt, i.e., to the eleven countries. In the upper panel, we report the
corresponding coefficients of the indicator for Greek events (GR), along with the standard
errors. All of the estimates of the eleven coefficients are positive, and the implied t-ratios
indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant on the five-percent level for more
than half of the countries. Increasing the confidence level to ten percent, only Germany and
the Netherlands show non-significant responses to Greek shocks. The point estimate for
Greece itself is 0.0631, which indicates that the events identified in Table A1 generated, on
average, a jump in the Greek sovereign CDS premium of over 6 percent. At a time-average
of 679 basis points in 2010, this average change in the CDS premium is roughly equivalent
to a jump of 43 basis points (679 ∗ .0631 = 42.8449).
The coefficients corresponding to countries other than Greece itself vary from 0.0036
(Germany) to 0.0277 (Italy). Measured relative to the magnitude of the Greek coefficient
(lower panel), these estimates imply a rate of transmission that ranges from 5.71% to
43.90%, with an average for all ten countries equal to 28.43%.25 These numbers indicate
economically important transmission rates. At the same time, the estimated coefficients
are strikingly similar in magnitude. To put this observation into perspective, recall that the
CDS premia are logged so that the coefficients measure the transmission of Greek shocks in
terms of percentage change in each countrys sovereign CDS premium. Thus, a one-percent
increase in the Portuguese CDS premium corresponds to a jump of 2.9 basis points, whereas
a one-percent increase in the French CDS premium corresponds to an increase of 0.7 basis
points based on 2010 averages.
25Notice that there is a strong correspondence between the statistical significance of the normalized and
of the absolute responses. The only exception is the UK, where we observe a slight loss of significance. We
attribute this difference to the use of bootstrap confidence intervals in the case of normalized response.
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Assessing transmission rates by levels, Table 4b repeats the estimates without prior
logging the CDS premia. Again, all estimates are positive (except for Germany, where the
estimate is slightly negative), although the significance drops for Spain and Portugal. The
coefficient for Greece indicates an average jump of 30.15 basis points in response to Greek
events, which is somewhat lower than, but in the same realm as, the benchmark computed
using the elasticities. The responses of European sovereign CDS premia relative to the
response of the Greek CDS premium ranges between −0.04% and 16.63%.
Figure 3 plots the impulse response functions for all eleven countries, including the
five-percent confidence bounds. The figure shows that a Greek shock generates a positive
contemporaneous response in the CDS premium of all countries, whose significance is com-
parable to the levels reported in Table 4a. In general, the response becomes insignificant
after one day. More importantly, the figure shows no negative response as the lag increases,
which indicates that the effects of Greek shocks are not transitory and the sovereign CDS
premia do not revert to their initial levels over time.26
Overall, the results from the baseline regression indicate substantial rates of transmis-
sion of sovereign risk across Europe. In the next step, we analyze the role of financial
linkages in that transmission.
4.2 Financial Linkages
We turn now to the estimation specified in (6) to analyze the role of financial linkages in
the Euro crisis, exploiting the time-variation of the exposure to Greek debt. We use three
measures for the linkages: exposure (i) to Total Greek Debt; (ii) to Greek Public Debt;
and (iii) to Debt of Greek Banks. All measures are normalized by average real GDP of the
years 2009 and 2010 and are logged. Whenever there is no risk of confusion, we will refer
to these measures as exposure to Greece.
Table 5 reports the estimation results based on model (6). Column I corresponds to
the specification that relies on exposure to Greece defined as Total Greek Debt. The
first row of the table reports the coefficients on the Greek dummy (GR), measuring the
Greek fixed effect of the average Greek shock. The coefficient is 0.0679, which is equal
26The confidence bounds are derived from a bootstrap distribution based on 1000 replications.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions
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Impulse response functions of CDS (log-changes) of eleven countries to a Greek shock of average
size for the 10 business days after impact (blue line). The red lines indicate the 5% confidence
bounds based on a bootstrap exercise with 1000 replications.
to the point estimate in our baseline regression (Table 4a). As for the fixed effects on
other countries, we choose to not report the estimates, although we check that the implied
average rate of transmission is consistent with the baseline results. In our analysis of the
role of financial linkages in the transmission of sovereign risk, the coefficient of interest
is the one on GR ∗ Total, i.e., the interaction term between the Greek dummy and the
exposure to Greece (lgr,q · 1gr,t in (6)). This estimated coefficient is positive and significant
at the one-percent level, as indicated by the implied t-ratio.
To assess transmission independent of the size of the original shock, the coefficient
of GR ∗ Total needs to be normalized by the average size of the Greek shock. Because
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we cannot observe the magnitude of the underlying shock, we normalize the coefficient
on GR ∗ Total by the Greek component of the Greek dummy (GR). The resulting ratio
measures how an increase in exposure to Greek debt affects the rate of transmission and thus
corresponds to the coefficient d in (5). The point estimates in Column I result in a value of
0.5538 for d. As discussed in Section 3, we cannot derive a theoretical distribution for the
estimator of d and resume bootstrapping to assess statistical significance. The lower part of
Table 4 summarizes the bootstrap confidence bounds based on 1000 bootstrap replications,
indicating that the one-percent confidence interval is on the positive axis. Based on a
one-percent confidence level, we can thus conclude that the bilateral exposure to Greek
debt plays a positive role in the transmission of sovereign risk. The exposure to Greek
debt is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant: the value of 0.5538
for d indicates that a one-percent reduction in the exposure to Greek debt decreases a
country’s CDS response to a Greek shock by more than one half of one percent. Based
on a rough calculation, the transmission rate to the country with the greatest average
exposure to Greece (1.22 percent of GDP) is, everything else equal, 46 percent larger than
the transmission rate to the country with the lowest average exposure (0.08 percent of
GDP). We take these results as motivation to scrutinize the different sub-components of
Total Greek Debt, i.e., Greek Public Debt and Debt of Greek Banks.
Column II corresponds to the specification where exposure to Greece is defined by Greek
Public Debt. The coefficient of the dummy GR is 0.0675, and the coefficient of the inter-
action term GR ∗ Public equals 0.0266. The implied t-ratios of both coefficients indicate
significance at the one-percent level. The ratio of the two point estimates in Column I is
0.3941 for d. The lower part of Column II shows that the bootstrap confidence interval
for the one-percent confidence level is on the positive axis. In addition, the value of d lies
at the center of the confidence intervals and is close to the mean of the sample of boot-
strap replications (mean (bootstr)), which is 0.4022. Figure 5(b) illustrates the bootstrap
distribution for d, the coefficient indicating transmission through financial linkages.
The value of 0.3941 for d indicates that a one-percent reduction in exposure to Greek
public debt decreases a country’s CDS response to a Greek shock by more than one third of
one percent. Combining this information with an average reduction of 27% in the exposure
to Greek public debt (compare Table 2b), our results indicate that the response to Greek
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Figure 4: Bootstrap Distribution of the Rate of Response to Greek News
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Distribution of the estimated parameter of the rate of response (d in Tables 3-8),
derived from 1000 bootstrap replications. The panels correspond to the financial
exposure to Greek Total Debt, Greek Public Debt and Debt of Greek Banks.
shocks might have declined as a consequence of the decrease of foreign exposure by roughly
ten percentage points (0.3941 ∗ 0.27 = 0.1064), which correspond to more than one third
of the average rate of transmission estimated in Section 4.1, i.e., 28.43%.
Column III of Table 5 reports parallel results when exposure to Greece is defined by
Debt of Greek Banks. Again, the coefficient of the interaction term GR ∗Bank is positive
and significant at the one-percent level, and the implied value of d is 0.1469. The bootstrap
confidence bounds indicate that the estimate of d is significant at the one-percent level.
The magnitude of d suggests that the role of exposure to debt of foreign banks is somewhat
less important for the transmission of sovereign risk: the elasticity of the spillover effects
to bank debt exposure is about one third of the corresponding elasticity with respect to
direct exposure to Greek sovereign debt.
The value of 0.1469 for the rate of transmission through interbank lending indicates
that a one-percent reduction in the exposure to Greek banks decreases a country’s CDS
response to a Greek shock by almost 0.15 percent. Again, in a rough calculation, the
relative response of the sovereign default risk of other European countries to a Greek shock
would have been 15 percent smaller in the absence of any financial exposure.
Overall, the baseline estimates suggest that the rates of exposure to Greek sovereign
debt and to debt of Greek banks played important roles in the spreading of sovereign risk
across the Euro area. Interestingly, our estimate of the elasticity of CDS responses to
changes in Greek Total Debt (0.5538) appears to decompose linearly into a bit less than
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one third stemming from exposure to Debt of Greek Banks (0.1469) and more than two
thirds stemming from exposure to Greek Public Debt (0.3941).27
4.3 Robustness
We conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we repeat our estimations measuring
CDS premia in basis points and the exposure to Greek debt as a percentage of GDP (i.e.,
we do not log these variables). In this linear specification, the CDS premia of the European
countries are assumed to react to a Greek shock independent of their respective levels. An
increase of the German CDS premium from 30 to 50 basis points is thus treated similarly
to an increase of the Portuguese CDS premium from 450 to 470 basis points. Moreover,
an increase of GDP-normalized exposure from 0.01 to 0.02 is assumed to have the same
effect as an increase from 0.11 to 0.12. This specification therefore puts less weight on the
time variation of very lightly exposed countries. Table 6 shows that both the sign and
the significance of the estimates are preserved under this linear specification. We observe,
however, that the estimate of the coefficient d in the specification involving the Debt of
Greek Banks is now larger than the estimate in the specification using Greek Public Debt.
The estimates of the coefficient d are 12.19 and 40.05, respectively. The reverse order
in the magnitude of d reflects the fact that the exposure to bank debt, which equals, on
average, 0.09% of GDP, is significantly lower than the average exposure to sovereign debt
(0.48%). With these point estimates, based on exposure as a percentage of GDP, we can
give the following absolute interpretation of our results. The value for the relative response
of 12.19 suggests that a reduction of exposure to Greek Public Debt of 0.1 percent of GDP
(the average exposure is 0.48 percent of GDP) implies that the response to Greek shocks
decreases by 0.012 basis points (0.001 ∗ 12.19 = 0.012). Like the estimates with the logged
variables, these results indicate that financial linkages are important for the transmission
of sovereign risk.
Next, we limit the number of countries in our sample. Specifically, we exclude Sweden
and the UK from our sample, which limits the analysis to countries within the Euro zone.
We thus include only the countries that assume implicit liabilities through the ECB balance
27It is clear that this calculation is overly simplified because the elasticity of variable y to variable x does
not linearly decompose into the elasticities of y to the subcomponents of x.
25
sheet. A comparison between the results of the reduced and the full samples can therefore
indicate whether the transmission of sovereign risk operates significantly through ECB
assets, in which case the coefficient d could be biased. Table 7 shows that the elasticity
of transmission to a change in financial linkages, d, is positive and significant on the one-
percent level for all specifications. Moreover, for the reduced sample, all three estimates of
d are very close to those of the full sample (compare Table 5). We can thus conclude that
our results are not driven by the specific sample of countries considered.
We then estimate our baseline specification, replacing the contemporaneous exposure
to Greek debt with the lagged exposure. This specification accounts for possible delays in
the diffusion of information regarding cross-border exposures, in which case the relevant
exposure for the transmission of sovereign risk is the one observed in the quarter ahead of
the date of a Greek shock. The results are shown in Table 8. The estimates for the coef-
ficient of interest, d, are all positive and significant at the one-percent level. Furthermore,
the point estimates are very close to those estimated in the specification with contempo-
raneous exposure, with the only exception being the case of Public Debt, in which the
value of d drops by one third. Overall, we can conclude that the results appear robust to
considerations about the speed of information diffusion.
As an additional robustness check, we try to capture not only the spillover effects
of direct exposure to Greek debt, but the entire network of financial linkages across the
countries in our sample. In particular, if French banks are strongly exposed to Greek
sovereign debt but Spanish banks are not, the Spanish banks might nevertheless suffer
from an increase in Greek sovereign risk due to their indirect exposure through the French
banking system. To capture these indirect effects, we invert the matrix of bilateral financial
linkages and estimate the corresponding Greek column of the matrix of financial linkages.
The exposure now captures the overall – i.e., the direct and the indirect – transmission of
Greek shocks to the respective European countries. Table 9 shows that the estimates for
d are significant at the one-percent level in all three specifications. Interestingly, the point
estimates are larger than those reported in Table 5, with an increase that ranges between
one fourth in the specification with Greek Public Debt and three fourths in the specification
with Debt of Greek Banks. These numbers demonstrate the importance of accounting for
the entire network of cross-border financial linkages when studying the propagation of
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sovereign risk, particularly in the context of the highly integrated European countries.
Our final concern is that days of Greek news might be interpreted by the market as
days of deteriorating global conditions, which would then be reflected in larger CDS premia
independent of the direct linkages of countries with Greece. Under this hypothesis, the
response to Greek shocks would thus correlate more strongly with the change in the general
exposure to risk than with the change in exposure to Greek debt. We thus re-estimate our
model, replacing our three measures of exposure to Greek debt with the corresponding
exposures to foreign debt, defined as the sum of the claims on each foreign country and for
each class of assets. The results are reported in Table 10. The point estimates for d in the
specification with Total Foreign Debt and Debt of Foreign Banks still have a positive sign,
but their significance is strongly rejected by the sample of bootstrap replications, which is
now centered around zero. For the specification with Foreign Public Debt, the estimates for
d are now negative and significant at the five-percent level. Overall, these results indicate
that exposure to foreign debt from origins besides Greece is at best unrelated to the reaction
of sovereign risk, and in one case the relation is the inverse of the one expected.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that financial linkages matter for the transmission of sovereign risk
in the Euro crisis. Our estimates show that a 10-percent increase in the exposure to foreign
sovereign debt increases the spillover effects of sovereign risk by 1.8 percent. Similarly, a
10-percent increase in exposure to debt of foreign banks increases these spillover effects by
1.2 percent. These estimates are statistically significant and economically relevant.
Methodologically, we follow the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (1989), identi-
fying financially relevant news shocks that can be attributed to Greece’s problems servicing
its sovereign debt. These shocks are used to assess the response of sovereign risk of other
European countries. We further relate the latter responses to cross-border financial link-
ages, controlling for transmission channels that are slow to change through fixed effects.
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A The Estimator
We derive the estimator used in main body of the paper. To do so, we will proceed in
several steps. First, we state a technical result on matrix inversion, which we use later.
Second, we derive a multi-variate generalized least squares (GLS) estimator under the type
of heteroskedasticity described in the main text. Third, we describe our bootstrapping
techniques.
A.1 Matrix Algebra
Claim 1 Let Σk be a collection of n × n matrices with full rank, for k = 1, ..., K. Let
further Ik denote m × m matrices of the following form: all off-diagonal elements equal
to zero, all diagonal elements are either zero or one and the Ik sum to the unit matrix:∑
k Ik = 1m. Then, (
K∑
k=1
Σk ⊗ Ik
)−1
=
K∑
k=1
Σ−1k ⊗ Ik (9)
holds, where ⊗ symbolizes the Kronecker matrix multiplication.
Proof. Multiplication of
∑
k Σk ⊗ Ik and the right hand side in (9) and exploiting the
basic properties of the Kronecker multiplication yields(∑
k
Σk ⊗ Ik
)∑
k
Σ−1k ⊗ Ik =
∑
k
(Σk ⊗ Ik)
(
Σ−1k ⊗ Ik
)
+
∑
k 6=j
(Σk ⊗ Ik)
(
Σ−1j ⊗ Ij
)
=
∑
k
ΣkΣ
−1
k ⊗ IkIk +
∑
k 6=j
ΣkΣ
−1
j ⊗ IkIj
=
∑
k
1n ⊗ Ik +
∑
k 6=j
ΣkΣ
−1
j ⊗ 0m
= 1n ⊗
∑
k
Ik = 1nm
A.2 GLS Estimator – Two Regimes of VCV-Matrix
Consider the n-dimensional model
yt = Φ˜z˜t + u˜t, (10)
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where Φ˜ = [Φ; β] and z˜t = [z
′
t; 1gr,t]
′. The residuals u˜t satisfy
Et(u˜t) = 0, Et(u˜tu˜
′
t) =
{
Σgr if t ∈ T gr
Σngr if t 6∈ T gr
, Et(u˜tu˜
′
s) = 0 for s 6= t (11)
where T gr is the set of greek events and Σgr and Σngr are assumed to be non-singular. Here
and in the following, Et denotes the expected value given the information set available at
period t.
Further assumptions are required, in particular, to guarantee the asymptotic normality
of the GLS estimator. Following Lu¨tkepohl (2007, p. 397), we assume throughout that
the residual u˜t is a white noise process, the matrix Φ˜ of autoregressive coefficients satisfies
a stability condition, and that the vector of exogenous variables xt, which appears among
the elements of zt, is generated by a stationary, stable VAR process which is independent
of the process u˜t.
For a sample size T , model (10) can be written compactly as
y = (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)φ˜ + u˜, (12)
where y is the nT ×1 vector obtained by stacking the T -dimensional vectors y(k) formed by
the time series of each kth component of yt, u˜ is similarly defined by stacking the vectors
u(k) formed by the time series of the components of u˜t, In is a n-dimensional identity
matrix and Z˜ = [z˜1, . . . , z˜T ] is the (p+ 1)×T matrix formed by the time series of vector z˜t.
Here, p+ 1 denotes the number of regressors in each equation of model (10), which include
p = nJ +m variables plus the Greek dummy. φ˜ = [Φ˜′(1), Φ˜
′
(2), . . . , Φ˜
′
(n)]
′ is the n(p+ 1)× 1
vector obtained from stacking the rows Φ˜(k) of matrix Φ˜.
Consistently with the assumptions in (11), the variance-covariance of the vector of
residuals u˜t satisfies
Σu˜ = Σgr ⊗ IgrT + Σngr ⊗ IngrT .
Here IgrT is a T -dimensional diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries corresponds to the
entries of the vector [1gr,1, . . . ,1gr,T ] and I
ngr
T = IT − IgrT . The GLS estimator of φ˜ thus
minimizes u˜′(Σu˜)−1u˜ and equalŝ˜
φ = [(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)]−1(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ y. (13)
Under the assumption in (11) and the regularity conditions discussed above, we can
show
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Claim 2 The GLS estimator of β˜ converges in distribution according to
√
T
(̂˜
φ− φ˜
)
d−→ N(0,Q−1VQ−1),
where Q ≡ plim
(
T−1(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)
)
is well-defined, symmetric and non-singular
and V ≡ (In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′).
Proof. Rearranging (13) we obtain
√
T
(̂˜
φ− φ˜
)
=
[
(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)
T
]−1
(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ u˜√
T
. (14)
Expanding the term within squared brackets yields
(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)
T
=
1
T

Z˜Ω11Z˜
′ Z˜Ω12Z˜ ′ . . . Z˜Ω1nZ˜ ′
Z˜Ω21Z˜
′ Z˜Ω22Z˜ ′ . . . Z˜Ω2nZ˜ ′
...
...
. . .
...
Z˜Ωn1Z˜
′ Z˜Ωn2Z˜ ′ . . . Z˜ΩnnZ˜ ′

where Ωij denotes the T × T block of Σ−1u˜ with (i, j) position. Applying Claim 1, we write
Ωij = ωij,gr · IgrT + ωij,ngr · IngrT ,
where ωij,gr denotes the component of Σ
−1
gr with (i, j) position. ωij,ngr is defined analogously.
Substituting for Ωij we obtain
1
T
Z˜ΩijZ˜
′ = ωij,grλ
∑
t∈T gr
z˜tz˜
′
t
Tgr
+ ωij,ngr(1− λ)
∑
t6∈T gr
z˜tz˜
′
t
Tngr
,
where Tgr and Tngr are used to denote the number of Greek and non-Greek events respec-
tively and λ = Tgr
T
is the sample probability of t ∈ T gr. Assuming that λ converges to a
finite number as T → ∞, the assumptions in (11) and the regularity conditions imposed
above ensure that each Z˜ΩijZ˜
′ has a well-defined probability limit. We can thus write
(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)
T
p−→ Q, (15)
where Q is a symmetric matrix (since Σ−1u˜ is symmetric) and is non-singular.
Expanding the second term in (14) we get
(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ u˜√
T
=
1√
T

∑n
j=1 Z˜Ω1,ju˜(j)∑n
j=1 Z˜Ω2,ju˜(j)
...∑n
j=1 Z˜Ωn,ju˜(j)
 ,
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where
1√
T
n∑
j=1
Z˜Ωi,ju˜(j) =
n∑
j=1
(
ωij,gr
√
λ
∑
t∈T gr
z˜tu˜j,t√
Tgr
+ ω1j,ngr
√
1− λ
∑
t6∈T gr
z˜tu˜j,t√
Tngr
)
.
The terms z˜tu˜j,t are martingale difference sequences with well-defined variance-covariance
matrices in both Greek and non-Greek regimes. We can therefore apply a version of the
Central Limit Theorem (see Hamilton (1994, p. 193)) to show that each 1√
T
∑n
j=1 Z˜Ωi,ju˜(j)
has a well-defined asymptotic normal distribution. Thus, we can write
(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ u˜√
T
d−→ N(0,V), (16)
where V ≡ (In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′). Combining (15) and (16), we obtain
√
T
(̂˜
φ− φ˜
)
d−→ N(0,Q−1VQ−1),
A.3 GLS Estimator – Time-Dependent VCV-Matrix and Con-
straints
Consider the following model
yt = Φ˜z˜t + u˜t Φ˜
′
(k) = Rk · ck, (17)
for k = 1, . . . , n. Here Φ˜ = [Φ, δ0,∆1], z˜t = [z
′
t,1gr,t, l
′
gr,q · 1gr,t]′. Thus, ∆1 denotes a vector
of coefficients on the interaction term lgr,q · 1gr,t. The equation on the right specifies a set
of linear restrictions on each row Φ˜(k) of the matrix of coefficients Φ˜. In particular,
Rk =
 Ip×p 0p×1 0p×101×p 1 0
0n×p 0n×1 ek
 and ck = [Φ(k), δ0,k, δ1]′
where ek is the kth unit vector of length n. This set of constraints restricts the components
of vector ∆1 to be equal to each other.
The residual process satisfies the following set of assumptions
Et(u˜t) = 0, Et(u˜tu˜
′
t) =
{
Σgr,q if t ∈ Tq ∩ T gr
Σngr,q if t ∈ Tq\T gr
, Et(u˜tu˜
′
s) = 0 for s 6= t, (18)
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where Tq is the set of dates in quarter q and T gr is defined as before. This formulation
allows the variance-covariance matrix of residuals to depend on the quarter q within the
two regimes.
Rewriting model (17) using the notation introduced in the previous case, we obtain
y = (In ⊗ Z˜′)φ˜ + u˜ φ˜ = R · γ. (19)
Here φ˜ = [Φ˜′(1), Φ˜
′
(2), . . . , Φ˜
′
(n)]
′ is the n(p + 1) + n × 1 vector of constrained coefficients
obtained from stacking the rows Φ˜(k) of matrix Φ˜, while γ is the n(p+ 1) + 1× 1 vector of
unconstrained coefficients and is defined as γ = [Φ′(1),Φ
′
(2), . . . ,Φ
′
(n), δ
′
0, δ1]
′.
The two coefficients are linearly related through the matrix R, which is defined by
R =
 W 0 . . . E10 . . . 0 ...
... 0 W En
 ,
where W and Ek, for k = 1, . . . , n satisfy
W =
 Ip×p01×p
0n×p
 and Ek =
 0p×n 0p×1e′k 0
0n×n ek
 .
The assumptions (18) on the distribution of the residuals imply that the vector of
residuals u˜ has a variance-covariance matrix that is now equal to
Σu˜ =
∑
q
{Σq,gr ⊗ (IgrT Iq) + Σq,ngr ⊗ (IngrT Iq)} ,
where IgrT and I
ngr
T are defined as above and Iq is a T × T matrix defined as
Iq =

0T1×T1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 0Tq−1×Tq−1 0Tq−1×Tq . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 0Tq−1×Tq ITq×Tq 0Tq×Tq+1 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0TQ×TQ
 , (20)
where 0Tq×Tq and ITq×Tq denote a zero matrix and an identity matrix with dimension Tq×Tq,
respectively.
We now derive an estimator for this model under this set of assumptions. Substituting
the constraint into the main equation, the GLS estimator of γ minimizes the expression
u˜′(Σu˜)−1u˜ =
(
y − (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)Rγ
)′
Σ−1u˜
(
y − (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)Rγ
)
.
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The estimator of γ is thus
γˆ =
[
R′(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u (In ⊗ Z˜′)R
]−1
R′(In ⊗ Z˜′)Σ−1u y. (21)
Under the assumptions in (18) and the same regularity conditions as before, we can
show
Claim 3 The GLS estimator γˆ converges in distribution according to
√
T (γˆ − γ) d−→ N(0,Q−1VQ−1).
where Q ≡ plim
(
T−1(R′(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)R)
)
is well-defined, symmetric and non-
singular and V ≡ R′(In ⊗ Z˜ ′)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜)R.
Proof. Rearranging (21) we obtain
√
T (γˆ − γ) =
[
R′(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)R
T
]−1
R′(In ⊗ Z˜ ′)Σ−1u˜ u˜√
T
. (22)
The expansion of the term within squared bracket yields
R′(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)R
T
= (23)
=
1
T

W ′Z˜ 0 . . . 0
0 W ′Z˜ . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . W ′Z˜
E ′1Z˜ E
′
2Z˜ . . . E
′
nZ˜


Ω11 Ω12 . . . Ω1n
Ω21 Ω22 . . . Ω2n
...
...
. . .
...
Ωn1 Ωn2 . . . Ωnn


Z˜ ′W 0 . . . . . . Z˜ ′E1
0 Z˜ ′W . . . . . . Z˜ ′E2
...
...
. . . . . .
...
0 0 . . . Z˜ ′W Z˜ ′En

=
1
T

W ′Z˜Ω11Z˜ ′W W ′Z˜Ω12Z˜ ′W . . . . . .
∑
jW
′Z˜Ω1jZ˜ ′Ej
W ′Z˜Ω21Z˜ ′W W ′Z˜Ω22Z˜ ′W . . . . . .
∑
jW
′Z˜Ω2jZ˜ ′Ej
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
... . . . W ′Z˜ΩnnZ˜ ′W
∑
jW
′Z˜ΩnjZ˜ ′Ej∑
iE
′
iZ˜Ωi1Z˜
′W
∑
iE
′
iZ˜Ωi2Z˜
′W . . .
∑
iE
′
iZ˜ΩinZ˜
′W
∑
j
(∑
iE
′
iZ˜ΩijZ˜
′Ej
)

where Ωij is used again to indicate the T × T block of matrix Σu with (i, j) position.
We can further rearrange this equation. To do so, we need first to realize that the
matrix Ωij is now formed by different submatrices which account for the varying covariance
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of residuals across quarters:
Ωij =

Ωij,1 0 . . . 0
0 Ωij,2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Ωij,Q
 .
Let Igr,q define the non-zero diagonal submatrix with Tq×Tq dimension of the matrix IgrT ·Iq.
Matrix Ingr,q is defined analogously. Applying Claim 1, we write
Ωij,q = ωij,gr,q · Igr,q + ωij,ngr,q · Ingr,q,
where ωij,gr,q and ωij,ngr,q denote the components with (i, j) position of Σ
−1
gr,q and Σ
−1
ngr,q,
respectively.
Using the definitions of Ωij, W and each Ei, we can now show that the blocks of the
expanded matrix in (23) contains the uncentered second moments of the regressors in z˜t
and thus must have a well-defined probability limit. Consider a partition of the previously
defined matrix Z˜ into a number of submatrices Z˜q which are formed by the time series of
z˜t within each quarter q. Thus, Z˜ = [Z˜1, . . . , Z˜Q]. We can show first that
1
T
W ′Z˜ΩijZ˜ ′W =
1
T
ZΩijZ
′ =
Q∑
q=1
1
T
ZqΩij,qZq
′
and, by the above decomposition of Ωij,q, each element in the sum can be expressed as
1
T
ZqΩij,qZ
′
q = n
ωij,gr,qλq∑
t∈Tq
ztz
′
t
Tgr,q
+ ωij,ngr,q(1− λq)
∑
t∈Tq\Tq
ztz
′
t
Tngr,q
 ,
where λq, Tgr,q and Tngr,q are defined as before but now depend on a specific quarter q
and n = P (t in quarter q) denotes the sample probability of a date t being in quarter q.
Assuming that the limits for λq and n as T →∞ exist and are finite, our set of assumptions
ensures that 1
T
ZqΩij,qZ
′
q converges in probability. We can thus write
1
T
W ′Z˜ΩijZ˜ ′W
p−→ Qij,
where Q is a symmetric matrix (since Σ−1u is symmetric) and is assumed to be non-singular.
Using a similar rearrangement, we can also show that
1
T
E ′iZ˜ΩijZ˜
′W =
Q∑
q=1
1
T
E ′iZ˜qΩij,qZq
′
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where for each q it holds
E ′iZ˜qΩij,qZq
′ = n
ωij,gr,qλq∑
t∈Tq
e˜i,tz
′
t
Tgr,q
+ ωij,ngr,q(1− λq)
∑
t∈Tq\Tq
e˜i,tz
′
t
Tngr,q
 .
Here e˜i,t ≡ E ′iz˜t = [(ei · 1gr,t)′, (e′i · (lgr,q · 1gr,t))′]′ is a (n+ 1)× 1 vector which includes the
indicator 1gr,t in the i
th position and the interaction between the Greek indicator and the
ith component of vector lgr,q in the (n+ 1)
th position. As this term has a well-defined limit
under our regularity assumptions, we can conclude that the matrix 1
T
E ′iZ˜ΩijZ˜
′W converges
in probability and thus
1
T
∑
i
E ′iZ˜ΩijZ˜
′W
p−→ Eij,
where Eij is well-defined. Finally, we can show analougsly that
∑
j
(∑
i
E ′iZ˜ΩijZ˜
′Ej
)
p−→ H,
where H is well-defined. Combining these three results, we obtain
R′(In ⊗ Z˜)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜ ′)R
T
p−→ Q, (24)
where Q is well-defined, symmetric and non-singular.
Given the assumption that the residual ut is conditional independent of the regressors
in z˜t, we can now apply the Central Limit Theorem, as we did in the previous case, and
we can show that the second term in (22) has a well-defined asymptotic distribution:
R′(In ⊗ Z˜ ′)Σ−1u˜ u˜√
T
d−→ N(0,V), (25)
where V ≡ R′(In ⊗ Z˜ ′)Σ−1u˜ (In ⊗ Z˜)R. Combining (24) and (25) we obtain
√
T (γˆ − γ) d−→ N(0,Q−1VQ−1).
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Total Debt Public Debt Bank Debt
mean !"#$% !"$&% !"!'%
std. dev. !"$(% !")*% !"!#%
min !"!&% !"!$% !"!!%
max *"++% !"##% !"+*%
No. Countries ** ** **
,-./012 34, 5-67-89:;<1: 3;6=96> ,<;?7?07" 5-.6</917 ;/12 @.7</9;A 318>9.BA C/;601A D1/B;6EA 4<;8EA <F1
G1<F1/8;6:7AHI-/<.>;8AH,J;96AH,K1:16H;6:H<F1HLM"H
in % of GDP, Average 2009/10
Table 2a: Summary Statistics - Exposure to Greek Debt, Time-Average
A.Total Debt
!""#$% !"&"$& !"&"$! !"&"$' !"&"$%
mean &""("") &"*(&") +&(,") *+(+") -*(,")
std. dev. "("") &+(#") &*(-") &+(!") !%(+")
min &""("") +!(!") %+(+") %!(-") !!(+")
max &""("") &,!(#") &&"(*") &"&(!") ##(+")
B. Public Debt
!""#$% !"&"$& !"&"$! !"&"$' !"&"$%
mean &"") &&-(') ++(") +,(') *'(")
std. dev. ") '"(+) '"(#) '&(*) '%(#)
min &"") +,(,) !'(#) &*(-) &*(*)
max &"") &*+(&) &!'(') &!&(*) &&'(&)
C. Bank Debt
!""#$% !"&"$& !"&"$! !"&"$' !"&"$%
mean &"") #!(,) **(#) ,#(&) '!(")
std. dev. ") ,+(') **(%) *%(!) '"(%)
min &"") #(%) &#(&) *(#) !(')
max &"") !!#(#) !**(+) !-,(+) &"%(!)
No. Countries &" &" &" &" &"
Table 2b: Summary Statistics - Exposure to Greek Debt, Evolution
Quarterly data, normalized 2009Q4 = 100
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All days, excluding 
Greek events
Days of positive Greek 
shocks
Days of negative Greek 
shocks
mean !"#$% $"&$% '$"()%
std. dev. *"+,% ,"-)% (")(%
min '*$")!% '!"-$% ')("$!%
max )+"&!% #$"!!% '#"&&%
Table 3a: Summary Statistics - Greek CDS spreads
Log changes by business day, January 1 2009 to December 31 2010
Source: Datastream, own calculations
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C*0%)$D).(E*F,()G'((H)%I$-H%
Log-changes by business day, by type and level of exposure to Greek debt.
Table 3b: Summary Statistics - CDS spreads in 10 European countries during Greek events
Source: Datastream, BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics. Countries are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
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AT BE DE ES FR GB IT NL PT SE GR
GR !"!#$! !"!#%& !"!!&$ !"!''# !"!'&& !"!#%( !"!')) !"!!)( !"!'(& !"!#%& !"!$&#
!"!!*$ !"!##& !"!##( !"!##! !"!!)# !"!!%$ !"!#!# !"!!*# !"!##* !"!!)* !"!#&%
+,- !".& !".. !".$ !".) !"$# !".( !".* !".. !"$! !"(% !".(
/0," (*' (*' (*' (*' (*' (*' (*' (*' (*' (*' (*'
!!"#$ !"'.&$ !"'*!! !"!.)# !"&.!' !"&$*& !"'*#$ !"(&*! !"##)& !"&%.# !"'*!!
mean (bootstr) !"'(' !"')%% !"!&#% !"&$#. !"&$). !"&!&$ !"((&% !"#!'. !"&%!* !"'*#.
.005 per-tile 1!"#%.& 1!"'#)& 1!"$*.( 1!"#$(# !"#.!& 1!"!$%& !"!'!* 1!"(!.$ 1!"#### 1!"!!')
.025 per-tile 1!"!..* 1!"!)($ 1!"(.#) !"!#& !"#*%$ 1!"!!!% !"##.) 1!"'.%$ !"!#%& !"!)(%
.975 per-tile !"()' !".$!$ !"&%#( !")(** !"..%( !"$&&# !")$*& !"&$#& !")'.( !".!&%
.995 per-tile !".#)( !"$&(( !"(%&) !"*'#. !"$'). !"%')' !"%*%% !"('!& !"%.$* !".)$%
Table 4a: Baseline GLS Estimation Results - logged CDS
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Table 4b: Baseline GLS Estimation Results - CDS in basis points
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I II III
GR 0.0679 0.0675 0.0674
0.0134 0.0134 0.0135
GR*Total 0.0376
0.0081
GR*Publ 0.0266
0.0049
GR*Bank 0.0099
0.0020
d (Total) 0.5538
d (Public) 0.3941
d (Bank) 0.1469
mean (bootstr) 0.5415 0.4022 0.1308
.005 per-tile 0.2775 0.2179 0.0568
.025 per-tile 0.3142 0.2501 0.0713
.975 per-tile 0.8514 0.6189 0.2166
.995 per-tile 1.0735 0.7401 0.2558
Table 5: Financial Linkages - Logged Exposure
Bootstrap Results
Note: Dependent variable vector of CDS, in logs. Countries are: Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Greece.
The underlying model is as speciﬁed in equaRon (11). Exogenous variables are CDS
for US and Japan (log), VIX of the US (log), federal fund rate, S&P market returns
and weekday dummies. Data on exposure to Greek debt are logged. Eight lags of
the dependent variables are included, none of the exogenous variables. All CDS
spreads and the VIX are in ﬁrst diﬀerences to remove a stochasRc trend.
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I II III
GR 35.1402 35.2130 34.8378
8.4329 8.4326 8.4332
GR*Total 397.0294
72.5000
GR*Publ 429.4027
73.1011
GR*Bank 1395.4000
238.8000
d (Total) 11.2984
d (Public) 12.1944
d (Bank) 40.0542
mean (bootstr) 10.7031 11.7488 38.0809
.005 per-tile 5.6408 6.5751 18.7495
.025 per-tile 6.8993 7.5114 21.8475
.975 per-tile 16.0139 17.8672 65.8435
.995 per-tile 18.2967 20.6559 75.9644
Table 6: Financial Linkages - Percentage Exposure
Bootstrap Results
Note: Dependent variable vector of CDS, in levels (bp). The model is speciﬁed in
equaIon (11). Countries are: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, UK, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Greece. Exogenous variables are CDS for US
and Japan (in levels), VIX of the US (in levels), federal fund rate, S&P market returns
and weekday dummies. Exposure to Greek debt is expressed as raIos of creditor's
GDP. See also note of Table 5. 
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I II III
GR 0.0674 0.0669 0.0668
0.0148 0.0148 0.0148
GR*Total 0.0374
0.0108
GR*Publ 0.0207
0.0058
GR*Bank 0.0096
0.0021
d (Total) 0.5549
d (Public) 0.3094
d (Bank) 0.1437
mean (bootstr) 0.5514 0.3020 0.1154
.005 per-tile 0.2003 0.1296 0.0335
.025 per-tile 0.2761 0.1535 0.0497
.975 per-tile 0.9039 0.5386 0.208
.995 per-tile 1.0166 0.635 0.2516
Table 7: Financial Linkages - Excluding UK and Sweden
Bootstrap Results
Note: Dependent variable vector of CDS, in logs. The model is speciﬁed in equaHon
(11). Countries are: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Greece. Data on exposure to Greek debt are logged. See
also Note of Table 5. 
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I II III
GR 0.0677 0.0676 0.0679
0.0134 0.0134 0.0134
GR*Total 0.0355
0.0090
GR*Publ 0.0167
0.0054
GR*Bank 0.0075
0.0024
d (Total) 0.5244
d (Public) 0.2470
d (Bank) 0.1105
mean (bootstr) 0.4625 0.2094 0.1004
.005 per-tile 0.1582 0.042 0.0284
.025 per-tile 0.2319 0.0778 0.0449
.975 per-tile 0.7513 0.3839 0.1668
.995 per-tile 0.8862 0.4588 0.2023
Table 8: Financial Linkages - Lagged Exposure
Bootstrap Results
Note: Dependent variable vector of CDS, in logs. The model is speciﬁed in equaHon
(11). Countries are: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, UK, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Greece. Data on exposure to Greek debt are
lagged and logged. See also Note of Table 5. 
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I II III
GR 0.0676 0.0674 0.0672
0.0134 0.0134 0.0134
GR*Total 0.0486
0.0129
GR*Publ 0.0331
0.0059
GR*Bank 0.0173
0.0034
d (Total) 0.7189
d (Public) 0.4911
d (Bank) 0.2574
mean (bootstr) 0.7389 0.5098 0.2420
.005 per-tile 0.3669 0.2627 0.1143
.025 per-tile 0.4129 0.3161 0.138
.975 per-tile 1.2093 0.7928 0.381
.995 per-tile 1.417 0.9611 0.4486
Table 9: Financial Linkages - Indirect Linkages
Bootstrap Results
Note: Dependent variable vector of CDS, in logs. The model is speciﬁed in equaHon
(11). Countries are: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, UK, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Greece. Indirect exposures to Greek debt are
obtained by inverHng the matrix of cross‐border bilateral linkages and logged. See
also Note of Table 5. 
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I II III
GR 0.0683 0.0677 0.0683
0.0134 0.0134 0.0134
GR*Total 0.0062
0.0282
GR*Publ ‐0.0261
0.0167
GR*Bank 0.0118
0.0174
d (Total) 0.0908
d (Public) ‐0.3855
d (Bank) 0.1728
mean (bootstr) ‐0.0167 ‐0.4584 0.0953
.005 per-tile ‐0.9543 ‐1.2832 ‐0.4478
.025 per-tile ‐0.7461 ‐1.0214 ‐0.3191
.975 per-tile 0.7187 ‐0.0425 0.5249
.995 per-tile 0.9338 0.0804 0.6425
Table 10: Financial Linkages - Total Exposure to Foreign Debt
Bootstrap Results
Note: Dependent variable vector of CDS, in logs. The model is speciﬁed in equaIon
(11). Countries are: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, UK, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Greece. Total exposure to foreign debt (in logs)
is the sum of a country's exposure to any other country in the BIS dataset. See also
Note of Table 5. 
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Date Description Sign
10/9/2009 Greece's central bank governor said the country's budget deficit this year may exceed 12 percent of economic output or
four times the EU ceiling. George Provopoulos said current data for the first three quarters of 2009 set budget
overspending at around 10 percent of gross domestic product. (Source: Lexis Nexis)
 + 
12/8/2009 Fitch Ratings cuts Greek debt to BBB+, the first time in 10 years it has been rated below investment grade. (Source:
Reuters)
 + 
3/3/2010 The Greek government announces a new austerity plan that will yield !4.8 billion in savings. The government decides to
move ahead with steep cuts in civil-service salaries and entitlements, and to to raise Greece's sales tax by two percentage
points. (Source: Wall Street Journal)
 - 
3/11/2010 An estimated 50,000 people take to the streets to protest the government's austerity plans. Flights were grounded and
trains suspended amid a nationwide general strike. (Source: Wall Street Journal)
 + 
3/25/2010 Mr. Trichet says the ECB will continue to accept bonds with ratings as low as triple-B-minus as collateral next year,
although it won't lend as much against lower-rated paper as against the ultra-safe triple-A-rated bonds like Germany's.
(Source: Wall Street Journal)
 - 
4/12/2010 Eurozone members commit to provide up to 30bn euros in loans to Greece over the next year. The funds would be
supplemented by money from the IMF that could yield an additional 15bn euros. The rates charged to Athens would be
about 5 percent for a three-year fixed loan. (Source: Financial Times)
 - 
4/22/2010 Eurostat said Greece's budget deficit reached 13.6 percent of GDP last year, up from previous Eurostat estimates of 12.9
percent. The news came as thousands of Greek civil servants staged a 24-hour strike and a march through central Athens
on Thursday in protest gainst planned reforms of the state-funded pension system due to reach parliament next month.
(Source: Financial Times)
 + 
5/2/2010 Prime Minister George Papandreou says Greece has reached a deal with the EU and IMF opening the door to a bailout in
return for extra savings of 30 billion euros over three years. Athens will get loans worth 110 billion euros in instalments
conditional on reforms over three years in the first rescue of a member of the 16-nation euro zone. (Source: Reuters)
 - 
5/3/2010 The ECB suspends the minimum credit rating required for Greek government-backed assets used in its liquidity-
rpoviding operations, removing the risk of Greek government bonds being excluded if ratings agencies turn against the
rescue programme. The euro fell 0.9 percent against the US dollar, although bond markets across Europe were stable
with yields on two-year Greek debt dropping below 10 percent for the first time in more than a week. Speculators are
increasingly betting that the eurozone crisis could escalated as short positions against the euro rose to a fresh record.
(Source: Financial Times)
 - 
5/20/2010 Thousands of Greek workers protest in Athens against cuts in wages and pensions. The 24-hour general strike called by
ADEBY and GSEE, the country's two largest unions, has shut down state schools, public transport and government
offices. Parliament is set to approve an overhaul of the state pension system this month under the terms of the bail-out.
The legislation includes proposal to raise the retirement age to 65 for both men and women from 2013 and reduce
pension payments. (Source: Financial Times)
 + 
6/15/2010 The ECB says it will apply a 5 percent extra charge to Greek government bonds used as collateral in lending operations
following a downgrade. (Source: Reuters)
 + 
8/12/2010 New statistics suggest Greek sank deeper into recession in the second quarter, with Elstat, the statistic service,
estimating the economy had shrunk 3.5. percent in the three months to the end of June from the same period last year.
There was also sharp rise in the year-on-year jobless rate from 8.5. percent to 12.5 percent in May a record increase
reflecting worsening conditions in the real economy, according to analysts. (Source: Financial Times)
 + 
9/8/2010 Greek second-quarter gross domestic product is revised down to show a 1.8% fall from the first three months of the year
compared with the initial estimate of a 1.5% decline. (Source: Wall Street Journal)
 + 
10/4/2010 Greece unveils an ambitious draft budget aiming to slash its budget deficit to 7 percent of GDP next year, deeper than
the 7.6 percent goal agreed with the Ecm, the ECB and the IMF and aimed at securing a return to the bond market at
some point next year. The 2011 draft budget sees the general government budget deficit drop to 16.28 bn in 2011 from a
forecast 18.5 bn this year on higher tax revenues and spending cuts with real GDP projected to contract by 2.6 percent.
Additionally, Greek 10-year bond yields fell 15 basis points to 9.975 percent following comments on Sunday by Wen
Jiabao, China premier, on Bejing interest in buying Greek bonds. (Source: Financial Times)
 - 
Table A1: Financially Relevant Information Shocks of Greek Origin
50
